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THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD: STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY’S EFFECT ON
GAMING LICENSE REVOCATION FOR
THE CASINO DEBTOR
Christopher M. Humes*
I. INTRODUCTION
Once thought to be financial thoroughbreds, casinos are feeling the finan-
cial squeeze of the economic recession. Nevada gaming revenues declined 10.4
percent in 2009, setting the state record for the largest single-year decrease.1
Over $10 billion in development projects are on indefinite hiatus in Atlantic
City, and more are postponed in Las Vegas.2 MGM Mirage has placed proper-
ties in Biloxi and Detroit on the market and sold the Treasure Island Hotel
Casino in Las Vegas.3 Local gaming giant Station Casinos recently filed for
bankruptcy.4 Notable gaming attorneys fear that there are many more bankrupt-
cies on the horizon.5
The casino debtor is a unique breed. The casino debtor must abide by both
the substantive and procedural laws of the bankruptcy court while also adhering
to the regulatory process of the state gaming control board. Consequently, there
are overlaps between the powers of the bankruptcy courts and the gaming regu-
lators.6 Legal commentators advocate the two competing bodies of power strike
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1 Howard Stutz, Casino Revenues Take Plunge, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 12, 2010, at 1A,
available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/gaming-revenues-fall-by-biggest-percentage-ever-
84117117.html.
2 Lori Tripoli, Wasn’t the Gaming Law Business Supposed to Be Recession-Proof?, 13
GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 23, 24 (2009).
3 Howard Stutz, Wynn Interested in Buying Some MGM Mirage Casinos, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.lvrj.com/news/breaking_news/43900967.html.
4 Motion for Interim and Final Orders Directing Joint Administration of Chapter 11 Cases
Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015(b) and Local Rule 1015(b) at 2, In re Station Casinos,
Inc., No. 09-52477 (Bankr. D.Nev.  July 29, 2009).
5 John C. Edwards, Casino Bankruptcies Nothing New for Gordon Silver Official, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J.,May 3, 2009, at 1E, available at http://www.lvrj.com/business/44255982.
html (Gerald Gordon stated “for the last 10 years, we’ve seen consolidation in the industry. I
think for the next five years we’re going to see deconsolidation in the industry. Properties are
going to be sold off.”).
6 See NEV. GAMING COMM’N REG. § 9.030 (2011) (§ 9.030 requires the casino debtor to
notify the regulatory body if “a licensee files any petition with the bankruptcy court for relief
111
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a copasetic relationship due to the jurisdictional tensions that underlie a bank-
ruptcy proceeding of a casino debtor.7
One of the most vital and contentious proceedings between a casino debtor
and a regulatory agency is a post-petition license revocation hearing. Much
debate exists about whether the license qualifies as property of the estate and
whether the regulatory agency can be exempted from the protections inherent
in the Bankruptcy Code due to the use of police and regulatory power. How-
ever, maybe the most contentious and impactful debate is whether the regula-
tory agency is free from the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction due to the Eleventh
Amendment’s guarantee of sovereign immunity.8 Sovereign immunity has been
a core belief of our government dating back to English common law.9 In Fed-
eral Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,10 Justice
Thomas stated:
Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation’s constitutional blueprint. States,
upon ratification of the Constitution, did not consent to become mere appendages of
the Federal Government. Rather, they entered the Union “with their sovereignty
intact.” An integral component of the “residuary and inviolable sovereignty,”
retained by the States is their immunity from private suit . . . .11
At the center of the tension concerning sovereign immunity lies 11 U.S.C.
§ 106(a),12 which authorizes the bankruptcy court to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. In the past fifteen years, the United States Supreme Court issued
three key decisions concerning the federal government’s ability to abrogate
statutorily states’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I power and the
bankruptcy court’s unique position in the long standing controversy.13 The
states’ ability to assert their sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings is
particularly relevant to casino bankruptcies due to the heavy involvement of the
state gaming regulator. With the Bankruptcy Code in question, state govern-
mental units and the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court are in direct conflict.14
This Note will outline the historical context, relevant Supreme Court deci-
sions, and the cloudy, ill-defined area in which bankruptcy courts are author-
ized to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity. Additionally, this Note will
explore the analysis courts use when determining whether a regulatory
as a debtor or has such a petition filed against it[.]” Additionally, the regulation requires the
regulatory body’s authorization of any appointed trustee.).
7 Robert W. Stocker II & Peter J. Kulick, Gambling with Bankruptcy: Navigating a Casino
Through Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 379-81 (2008).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State”).
9 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3524 (3d ed.
2008).
10 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
11 Id. at 751-52 (citations omitted); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9.
12 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006) (“Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sover-
eign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section
with respect to the following: (1) Sections 105 . . . 1327 of this title.”).
13 See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) [hereinafter Semi-
nole]; Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll.
v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
14 Gregg W. Zive, The House Doesn’t Always Win, 8 GAMING L. REV. 278, 292 (2004).
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agency’s power to revoke licenses is exempted from the automatic stay. Lastly,
this Note will argue that the three recent Supreme Court cases restored order to
the bankruptcy court’s ability to pierce the sovereign immunity of a regulatory
agency during a license revocation hearing of a casino debtor.
II. THE SEMINOLE DOCTRINE AND ENSUING AFTERMATH
A. The Creation of the Seminole Doctrine
In the long history of the United States Supreme Court, there has only
been one instance where the Court upheld an abrogation of state sovereign
immunity by Congress’ use of an Article I power.15 In Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co.,16 the Court declared that Congress could abrogate sovereign immu-
nity through the use of the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Court based its
reasoning on the fact that if Congress could not create a cause of action against
the states, then no one would be able to hold the states liable for money dam-
ages.17 The Court further noted, “in many situations, it is only money damages
that will carry out Congress’ legitimate objectives under the Commerce
Clause.”18
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,19 the Supreme Court took an
affirmative step to limit its previous holding of Union Gas.20 In Seminole, the
Court considered whether Florida could assert its sovereign immunity to protect
itself from being haled into court for claims of violating the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (“IGRA”).21 Congress enacted the IGRA under the power of
the Indian Commerce Clause in Article I of the United States Constitution.22
The IGRA places a duty on the State to “negotiate with the Indian tribe in good
faith” to create a compact governing the conduct of gaming activities,23 and
provides the United States district courts with jurisdiction over all claims aris-
ing out of a failure to negotiate.24 The Seminole Indian Tribe brought suit
against the State of Florida for failure to negotiate, but Florida moved to dis-
miss the complaint on the grounds that the commencement of the suit violated
its sovereign immunity.25
While recognizing the principle of stare decisis with regard to Union Gas,
the Court chose to revisit the issue due to the Union Gas’s splintered decision
and the plurality’s desire to “deviate sharply from our established federalism
jurisprudence.”26 Union Gas was a 5-4 decision, and the Court’s makeup
15 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 59-60.
16 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
17 Id. at 20.
18 Id.
19 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
20 Susan E. Hauser, Necessary Fictions: Bankruptcy Jurisdiction After Hood and Katz, 82
TUL. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (2008).
21 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006); Seminole, 517 U.S. at 47.
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8, cl. 3.
23 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3).
24 Id. § 2710(7)(A)(i).
25 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 52.
26 Id. at 63-65.
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changed dramatically in the time between Union Gas and Seminole.27 In Semi-
nole, the addition of Justice Thomas gave dissenting justices in Union Gas the
ability to reverse the opinion and revert back to a broad interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment.28 No longer could Congress abrogate state sovereign
immunity through the use of an Article I power.
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a
particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of
suits by private parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment
restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circum-
vent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.29
Seminole had a drastic impact on the effectiveness of the bankruptcy court
to effectuate its orders upon the states. Eleven U.S.C. § 106(a) allows the bank-
ruptcy court to abrogate state sovereign immunity and issue “an order, process,
or judgment . . . including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery,
but not including an award of punitive damages” against a governmental unit.30
However, the Bankruptcy Clause is one of the Article I powers authorized to
Congress by the United States Constitution.31 Seminole’s prohibition of abro-
gation of state sovereign immunity stemming from Article I powers immedi-
ately placed § 106(a)’s constitutionality in question.
In In re Estate of Fernandez,32 the State of Louisiana asserted sovereign
immunity when NCNB Texas National Bank brought an adversary proceeding
against the state to determine the validity of title concerning purchased prop-
erty.33 The Fifth Circuit rested its argument upon Justice Scalia’s statements
espousing the similarities between the Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy
Clause.34 After determining the Bankruptcy Code was within the scope of Sem-
inole’s reach, the Fernandez Court easily determined that § 106(a) was
unconstitutional.35
Additionally, doubt began creeping in concerning limitations on Con-
gress’s power to determine when a state has waived its sovereign immunity.
Traditionally, a state waived its immunity from suit when it filed a claim in a
bankruptcy proceeding pursuant to § 106(b).36 However, in Schlossberg v.
Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths),37 the court stated, “[w]hile 11 U.S.C
§ 106(b) may correctly describe those actions that, as a matter of constitutional
27 Justice Marshall, Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Blackmun left the court
between the time of Union Gas and Seminole.
28 Hauser, supra note 20, at 1192.
29 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (footnote omitted).
30 11 U.S.C § 106(a) (2006).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
32 Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co., LLC (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d 241
(5th Cir. 1997).
33 Id. at 243.
34 Id. at 244 (citing Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 105 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)).
35 Id. at 246.
36 Hauser, supra note 20, at 1188 (citing Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc. v. Puerto Rico,
270 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming the constitutionality of §106(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides that a governmental unit waives sovereign immunity by filing a proof
of claim)).
37 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
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law, constituting a state’s waiver of the Eleventh Amendment, it is nevertheless
not within Congress’ power to abrogate such immunity by ‘deeming’ a
waiver.”38
Future circuit splits and judicial confusion within the bankruptcy courts
began to demonstrate why the Seminole Doctrine was problematic.39 Eventu-
ally, the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy courts were rigidly applying the
Seminole Doctrine and finding § 106(a) unconstitutional.40 However, a few
outlying cases either made cognizable arguments for the constitutionality of
§ 106(a) or outright held that it was a valid exercise of congressional power.41
The majority of these cases held that the Bankruptcy Code was made pursuant
to both the Article I powers and the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.42
Although Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment expands “federal power
at the expense of state autonomy,”43 Seminole instructed the lower courts to ask
the question: “was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional provi-
sion granting Congress the power to abrogate?”44 The logical conclusion is that
Congress enacted The Bankruptcy Reform Act, including § 106(a), under “the
same specifically enumerated Article I bankruptcy power that it has tradition-
ally relied on in enacting prior incarnations of the bankruptcy law dating back
to 1800—sixty-eight years before the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”45 No evidence exists to the contrary.46 Since the Bankruptcy Code was
not enacted specifically pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, abrogation of
sovereign immunity is not permissible under the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Additionally, the Rehnquist Court took steps in subsequent cases to curtail
the ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity. In City of Boerne v. Flores47
and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Sav-
ings Bank,48 the Court held that in order to utilize the powers granted under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress is required to “identify con-
38 Id. at 1147.
39 See generally id.; see also In re S. Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. 419 (Bankr.
E.D.Okla.,1995.).
40 See In re L. Luria & Sons, Inc., 282 B.R. 504 (Bankr. S.D.Fla.,1999); Nat’l Cattle Cong.,
Inc. v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Comm’n (In re Nat’l Cattle Cong., Inc.), 91 F.3d 1113 (8th
Cir. 1996); In re Sacred Heart, 204 B.R. 132, (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1997).
41 See generally Headrick v. Georgia (In re Headrick), 200 B.R. 963 (Bankr. S.D.Ga.
1996); Mather v. Okla. Emp’t Comm’n (In re S. Star Foods, Inc.), 190 B.R. 419 (Bankr.
E.D.Okla.,1995.); Lees v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Lees), 252 B.R. 441 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 2000).
42 U.S. CONST amend. XIV (The Fourteenth Amendment specifically states that “Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article” and,
therefore, authorizes piercing state sovereign immunity in appropriate cases.).
43 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
44 Id.
45 Schlossberg v. Maryland (In re Creative Goldsmiths of D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1146
(4th Cir. 1997).
46 Id.; See generally In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241, 244 (5th Cir. 1997) and NVR Homes,
Inc. v. Clerks of the Cir. Ct. for Anne Arundel, Cnty., Md. (In re NVR, L.P.), 189 F.3d 442
(4th Cir. 1999).
47 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
48 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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duct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive provisions, and
must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct.”49
As discussed above,50 there is no evidence to indicate that Congress
enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act pursuant to the powers granted under the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, some courts utilize the rationale that any act
of Congress will implicate protections of liberty and property granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment.51 This argument is circumspect. Under its rationale, if
the Enforcement Clause is construed in such breadth to encompass the Bank-
ruptcy Code, then every act of Congress would have the heavy handed protec-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Boerne and Prepaid’s identification of
the Enforcement Clause as a remedial power rather than a plenary one imple-
ments a heavy burden that such a catch-all form of logic cannot shoulder.
B. Core Bankruptcy Policy Concerns Emanating from the Creation of the
Seminole Doctrine
Constitutional underpinnings aside, multiple policy rationales place state
sovereign immunity in direct conflict with the power to effectuate a judicious
bankruptcy court proceeding. The well-founded purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code is to give honest debtors a “fresh start” by reorganizing their financial
accounts and reconcile relationships with their present creditors.53 Under bank-
ruptcy law, the Eleventh Amendment could be used as less of a protective mea-
sure and more as a device to assert an unfair advantage over creditors who do
not have such a powerful constitutional tool at their disposal.54 Bankruptcy
Judge Gregg W. Zive stated “[s]tate immunity from the authority of federal
courts makes the orderly administration of bankruptcy cases untenable.”55
The bedlam that can ensue by ensuring the immunity of an unconsenting
state begins at the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Once a case is filed,
all of the debtor’s equitable interests become property of the bankruptcy
estate.56 Creditors then file claims seeking maximum reimbursement on the
debtor’s liabilities.57 Debtors and the bankruptcy estate are afforded protection
from overzealous creditors in the form of the automatic stay, which precludes
any collection activity for a predetermined amount of time during the proceed-
ing.58 The purpose of the stay is to give the debtor a “breathing spell”59 and
have a period of time to effectively reorganize his financial situation.
49 Id. at 639.
50 See text accompanying notes 38-41.
51 See In re S. Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D.Okla. 1995).
52 In re Creative Goldsmiths of D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 (4th Cir. 1997).
53 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
54 Leonard H. Gerson, A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Limiting
the Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 9 (2000).
55 Zive, supra note 14, at 292.
56 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006).
57 See id. § 501(a).
58 Id. § 362(b)(3)(B).
59 Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119, 121 (4th Cir. 1988) (“The automatic
stay is one of the fundamental protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors . . . . It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment
or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into
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States often appear on the list of creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding due
to liens, unpaid taxes, administrative fees, educational loans, or various other
costs the state can impose on an individual or an organization. A state would
quickly collect on these costs absent the protection of the automatic stay. In so
doing, the state would not only disrupt the mechanics of the proceeding with
respect to the debtor, but also with respect to the equitable distribution of the
estate to all remaining creditors.60 The bankruptcy system is not premised on
being an elective procedure for the creditor, but “a collective, comprehensive,
and compulsory process—binding upon all creditors.”61 If the state was
allowed to circumvent the protection of the automatic stay through the concept
of sovereign immunity, the state transforms itself into a “supercreditor” capable
of enjoying the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code and susceptible to few of the
liabilities of the typical creditor.62
The inequity created by the Seminole Doctrine is illustrated in In re
Sacred Heart Hospital of Norristown.63 Sacred Heart, a community hospital in
Pennsylvania, sought relief under Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and the state filed a
proof of claim for unreimbursed employment benefits.64 Throughout the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, Sacred Heart continually submitted invoices for payment of
services rendered to the state.65 After receiving no response, Sacred Heart
eventually filed an adversary proceeding seeking a judgment for the amount
owed to the hospital by the state.66 In response, the state moved to dismiss the
proceeding on the grounds that the adversary hearing violated the state’s sover-
eign immunity.67
In a pre-Seminole era, the state would have waived its sovereign immunity
by filing a proof of claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 106(b).68 The Sacred Heart
court decided that this was not enough to abrogate sovereign immunity. Semi-
nole created such a hard and fast rule that the court had no choice but to hold
that Congress cannot authorize abrogation of sovereign immunity through the
use of the Bankruptcy Code. “[T]here is simply no principled basis to distin-
bankruptcy.” citing S.REP. NO. 989 at 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5840-41).
60 Laura B. Bartell, Getting to Waiver—A Legislative Solution to State Sovereign Immunity
in Bankruptcy After Seminole, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 17, 43 (2000).
61 Ralph Brubaker, From Fictionalism to Functionalism on State Sovereign Immunity: The
Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutory Ex Parte Young Relief After Hood, 13 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 59, 68 (2005).
62 Steven M. Richman, More Equal Than Others: State Sovereign Immunity Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 603, 604 (1990).
63 Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Pennsylvania (In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norris-
town), 133 F.3d 237 (3rd Cir. 1998).
64 Id. at 239.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 239-40.
67 Id. at 240.
68 11 U.S.C. § 106(b) (2006) (“A governmental unit that has filed a proof of claim in the
case is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to a claim against such
governmental unit that is property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence out of which the claim of such governmental unit arose.”).
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guish the Bankruptcy Clause from other Article I clauses . . . [a]s such, we hold
that the Bankruptcy Clause is not a valid source of abrogation power.”69
In Sacred Heart, the state used the Bankruptcy Code to its advantage but
sidestepped any potential liability through the use of sovereign immunity. The
estate was not allowed to benefit from payment for services rendered, thereby,
decreasing the amount available for the creditors as a whole. The state’s bene-
fits are two-fold: it is permitted to collect on a proof of claim while simultane-
ously avoiding any payment amount to the estate. Avoidance of such
preferential treatment to an individual creditor and depletion of the estate are
two fundamental policies of the Bankruptcy Code that are frustrated by the
Seminole Doctrine.
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 dealt explicitly with
uniform jurisdiction to resolve the problem of split forums for different causes
of action stemming from the Bankruptcy Code.70 Enabling the state to enter
various phases of bankruptcy voluntarily and to opt out of others strips down
the goal of establishing one jurisdiction for bankruptcy cases.71 If the state is
not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor will be forced to try bank-
ruptcy issues in front of a state tribunal.72 Fragmenting jurisdiction between
commercial creditors in federal court and state creditors in state court would
prove to be burdensome to all involved.73 Creditors will be forced to wait an
exorbitant amount of time to recover on their claims while the debtor is forced
to live in litigation purgatory for years rather than have an expedient remedy to
his financial crisis. Lastly, the judges adjudicating the matter will possess far
less expertise and experience concerning the Bankruptcy Code than the
appointed federal judges sitting on the bench in the Bankruptcy Courts.74
The delicate balance of state and federal interests that exist in bankruptcy
proceedings would be thrown askew if the state was able to exempt itself from
the process at will.75 The bankruptcy court commonly defers to state law when
defining property rights.76 Absent a federal interest in deviating from the state
law, the bankruptcy court should not deviate from this deference in its analy-
sis.77 If the state was able to pick and choose its entrances into the bankruptcy
forum, the state could foreseeably only enter at the strategically appropriate
times in the bankruptcy case. A state could bypass the application of some state
law by claiming sovereign immunity, but enter other cases when beneficial to
the state. In essence, “a state would be able to use its sovereign immunity not as
69 In re Sacred Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d at 243.
70 Ned W. Waxman & David C. Christian, Federal Powers After Seminole Tribe: Constitu-
tionally Bankrupt, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 467, 484-85 (1999).
71 Id. at 483-85.
72 Id. at 484 (citing In re NVR L.P., 206 B.R. 831, 843 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997)) (“[T]he
Court has held that the Supremacy Clause not only empowers a state court to exercise juris-
diction over a federal claim . . . but compels it to do so.”).
73 Id. at 484-84.
74 Id. at 484.
75 Gerson, supra note 54, at 8.
76 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1978).
77 Id.
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a means of protecting itself, but as a mechanism for gaining an unfair advan-
tage at the expense of other creditors.”78
These policy considerations have shown to be disruptive and burdensome
to the bankruptcy courts.79 In addition, the inequitable nature of the use of
sovereign immunity created scenarios that were unpalatable to sitting judges.80
After years of splintered precedents between the circuits and confusion on the
application of Seminole, the Supreme Court finally granted certiorari to Ten-
nessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood81 with the intent of specifically decid-
ing the constitutionality of § 106(a).
C. Hood Takes a Small Step in Rectifying the Seminole Doctrine
After more than ten years post-Seminole and with various streams of logic
emanating from lower courts regarding the constitutionality of  § 106(a), the
Court granted certiorari to review the issue in Tennessee Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood82 after repeatedly declining many other opportunities.83
In Hood, a debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and retained a balance of
roughly $4,000 on her student loans.84 The Tennessee Student Assistance Cor-
poration (“TSAC”), a governmental corporation created by the Tennessee legis-
lature, did not participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, but was assigned the
claim initiated by Sallie Mae for the balance on the student loans.85 After a
general discharge was issued to the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), she real-
ized her student loans were not included under the general discharge regula-
tions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).86 The debtor then reopened her
bankruptcy proceeding and commenced an adversary proceeding against TSAC
to determine if the student loans were dischargeable.87 TSAC filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and asserted its state sovereign
immunity.88 The motion was denied because § 106(a) allocated the bankruptcy
court the power to abrogate sovereign immunity.89 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed and held that § 106(a) was a constitutionally valid exercise of
power.90
78 Gerson, supra note 54, at 9.
79 See Hauser, supra note 20, at 1196-1202.
80 Id.
81 Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 443 (2004) [hereinafter Hood].
82 Id.
83 Joseph Pace, Bankruptcy as Constitutional Property: Using Statutory Entitlement Theory
to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 119 YALE L.J. 1568, 1586 (2010) (citing many deni-
als of certiorari to decide 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)’s constitutionality).
84 Hood, 541 U.S. at 444.
85 Id. at 443-44.
86 Id. at 444. (11 U.S.C. § 727(b) states that all prepetition debts are discharged except those
listed under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Section 523(a)(8) instructs the court that student loans
secured by a governmental unit are not dischargeable unless the loan places an “undue hard-
ship” on the debtor.)
87 Id.
88 Id. at 445.
89 Id.
90 Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755, 767 (2003).
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In a voting configuration uncommon to sovereign immunity issues, seven
Justices joined the majority opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist.91 The Court
drew an analogous line between the practice of admiralty and bankruptcy law
emphasizing the in rem nature of the two.92 In an in rem jurisdiction such as
admiralty or bankruptcy law, a state maintains its sovereign immunity as long
as the state is not in possession of the res.93 In bankruptcy proceedings, the
state will never be in control of the res because bankruptcy courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property and the estate.94 Therefore,
the discharge of a debtor’s liabilities under § 727(a) is a constitutionally per-
missible exercise of power and does not infringe on the state’s immunity.95
However, the underlying constitutional issue of concern in Hood was not
the discharge itself, but the commencement of an adversary proceeding against
the state.96 The Court deftly distinguished an adversary proceeding for the pur-
poses of determining a discharge of student loans from one based on in per-
sonam jurisdiction. The Court pointed to the lack of money damages sought by
the debtor and the absence of a “coercive judicial process.”97 By finding that an
undue hardship determination was an adversary proceeding focused primarily
on the res and not the persona, the Court narrowly held that this specific type of
adversary proceeding was a constitutionally valid exercise of in rem jurisdic-
tion.98 Consequently, and more importantly, the Court avoided the issue of
§ 106(a)’s constitutionality on the principle that the Court should not anticipate
questions of constitutional law, and that the present “constitutional concern is
merely hypothetical.”99
D. Katz Restores Order to Bankruptcy Proceedings
Central Virginia Community College v. Katz100 presented the Court, once
again, with a prime opportunity to finally resolve the suspect constitutionality
of § 106(a). The facts set in Katz were strikingly similar to Hood, yet, in this
scenario, the adversary proceeding was brought to litigate a preference avoid-
ance claim.101 In Katz, the debtor was a chain of bookstores, which made a
series of payments to state educational institutions before filing for Chapter 11
under 11 U.S.C. § 101.102 Bernard Katz, the court-appointed liquidating super-
visor, sought to recover the payments on the grounds that the payments had
91 Hauser, supra note 20, at 1202 n.138.
92 Hood, 541 U.S. at 446-47.
93 Id.
94 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2006) (Since the Federal Bankruptcy Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over “all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement
of such case, and of property of the estate,” the state will never be in control of the property
of the estate and therefore not have its sovereign immunity affected.).
95 Hood, 541 U.S. at 447-48 (citing In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924, 929 (4th Cir. 1999)).
96 Hauser, supra note 20, at 1204.
97 Hood, 541 U.S. at 450.
98 Id. at 450-455.
99 Id. at 455.
100 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
101 Id. at 360 (11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) and 550(a) allows a trustee to avoid certain transfers
made within 90 days before the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding).
102 Id.
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been preferential payments on the eve of the bankruptcy.103 The key distinction
between Hood and Katz was that the recovery on a preference avoidance claim
against the state would result in a judgment of money damages. Therefore,
unlike the adversary proceeding in Hood, which could be painted as an exten-
sion of the in rem jurisdiction due to the absence of monetary remedies, Katz
posed a more challenging question to the Court.104
The opinion was authored by Justice Stevens and joined by four other
Justices.105  Initially, the Court retreated from Seminole.106 While the Court
recognized that the prior Courts assumed the Seminole holding would apply to
bankruptcy courts, the Court declared that this “assumption was erroneous.”107
However, the Court once again sidestepped the direct question, the constitu-
tionality of  § 106(a), by reflecting back to the Constitutional Convention and
holding that all states consented to a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
regarding the bankruptcy court.108 To bolster its rationale, the Court focused on
the unique uniformity requirement in the bankruptcy clause.109
The contrast between the Articles of Confederation’s various inconsistent
rules concerning rights of a debtor and the states’ cession to a uniform code of
bankruptcy in the Constitution persuaded the Court that the states had volunta-
rily relinquished a small piece of their sovereign immunity.110 The Court’s
analysis revealed that the waiver permitted a narrow scope to only include “a
subordination of whatever sovereign immunity they might otherwise have
asserted in proceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts.”111 Therefore, Katz held that a state is not allowed to assert
sovereign immunity when a bankruptcy court is acting pursuant to in rem juris-
diction or effectuating matters that are ancillary to a bankruptcy court’s in rem
jurisdiction.112
Scholars sympathetic to the outcome have criticized the Katz ruling as
preconceived results searching for a principled rationale.113 Thus, despite the
criticism of the path Katz took, there is support for the destination it reached.
Where Hood had pried open the issue of abrogating state sovereign immunity
in respect to a narrowly tailored scenario, Katz “appeared to carve out a gaping
bankruptcy-sized hole.”114
103 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006); Id. § 550(a).
104 Pace, supra note 83, at 1588.
105 The 5-4 voting configuration marked a return to the normal trend concerning states sov-
ereign immunity issues.
106 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll., 546 U.S. at 363.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 377-78.
109 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“To establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
cies throughout the United States”) (emphasis added).
110 See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll., 546 U.S. at 373-77.
111 Id. at 378 (emphasis omitted).
112 Id. at 373.
113 Pace, supra note 83, at 1590 n. 116.
114 Id. at 1590.
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III. GAMBLING LICENSE REVOCATION OF A CASINO DEBTOR
One of the major friction points pitting sovereign immunity against the
protections afforded by the Bankruptcy Code is the scope of the regulatory
body to make administrative decisions concerning the gaming license versus
the automatic stay.115 The Nevada Gaming Control Board has regulations that
permit the administrative unit to investigate and deny or revoke licensure due to
unsuitable conditions of the casino,116 unsavory affiliates,117 inadequate finan-
cial qualifications,118 or a host of other reasons. However, the breadth of the
regulatory body’s scope of power comes under scrutiny at the commencement
of a bankruptcy proceeding because of the automatic stay.
The automatic stay arises at the commencement of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding and prohibits any creditor from taking any action to collect on a pre-
petition claim such as: enforcing pre-petition judgments against property of the
estate, enforcing or perfecting any liens against the property of the estate, or
taking any action to obtain possession of property of the estate.119 However,
the Code does permit exceptions to the stay on the grounds of public policy.120
One such exception is the allowance of a commencement of a suit by a govern-
mental unit to enforce its police and regulatory powers.121
A three-pronged analysis arises when a regulatory agency attempts to
revoke or limit a casino debtor’s gaming license during bankruptcy: 1) whether
the license fits under the definition of property of the estate and, therefore,
qualifies for protection under the automatic stay; 2) whether the gaming control
board is acting under its police and regulatory power by trying to revoke the
license; and 3) whether the state agency has the ability to claim sovereign
immunity against the bankruptcy court under the Seminole/Hood/Katz line of
cases.
A. Does the Gaming License Qualify as Property?
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) states in relevant part:
(a) The commencement of a case . . . of this title creates an estate. Such estate is
comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) [A]ll legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case.122
The legislative history on the Bankruptcy Code, including both the Senate
and House Reports, evidences the congressional intent that courts should con-
strue property of the estate under § 541(a) to encompass a broad scope of legal
and equitable interests.123 The Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Court of Northern
115 John M. Czarnetzky, When the Dealer Goes Bust: Issues in Casino Bankruptcies, 18
MISS. C. L. REV. 459, 462 (1998).
116 NEV. GAMING COMM’N REG. § 3.010 (2011).
117 Id. § 3.080.
118 Id. § 3.050.
119 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
120 Id. § 362(b).
121 Id. § 362(b)(4).
122 Id. § 541.
123 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983) (citing H.R.REP. NO.
95-595, at 367 (1977)).
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Iowa engaged in a lengthy analysis of whether or not a dog racing license was
property of the estate in In re National Cattle Congress, Inc.124 The court
examined a string of cases that examined propriety interests in airport landing
slots under the regulatory control of the Federal Aviation Administration,125 a
broadcasting license regulated by the Federal Communications Commission,126
and a certificate of approval to operate a school.127 In each of these cases, the
license or propriety right was held to be property of the estate even though the
property was subject to regulation and considered a privilege in the eyes of the
state. After examining these cases, the Cattle Congress court decided that a dog
racing license was considered property of the estate.128
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit made a similar determination concerning
a liquor license in In re Barnes.129 Albeit not a gaming license, the Barnes
court highlighted points that are applicable to both types of licensure. The court
spoke to the breadth of § 541’s interpretation and how a license easily fits
within the large scope provided by the Bankruptcy Code.130 The court also
dismissed the notion that a license is not property simply because it is revoca-
ble, “the sale of many goods require government approval and of course prop-
erty can be taken away from a person for various reasons . . . .”131
Courts have held that even if a state court or statute does not consider a
license to qualify as property, a federal court may decide differently.132 Fur-
thermore, other gaming license related issues litigated in the bankruptcy courts
have also held that the gaming license qualified as property of the estate.133
The creditor arguing that a gaming license does not qualify as property under
§ 541 will face an uphill battle. As evidenced by the large amounts of case law,
the gaming license will most likely be considered property, and therefore, fall
under the protection of the automatic stay required by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
B. Does the Regulatory Agency Revocation of a Gaming License Fall
Within the Police and Regulatory Power Exception to the Automatic
Stay?
There has been much debate between scholars as to whether or not the
revocation of a gaming license falls within 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)’s exception
to the automatic stay based on a governmental unit bringing a suit under the
police and regulatory powers.134 The long-standing view has been to examine
124 179 B.R. 588, 592-93 (Bankr. N.D.Iowa 1995).
125 Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Gull Air, Inc. (In re Gull Air, Inc.), 890 F.2d 1255, 1260 (1st
Cir. 1989).
126 In re Cent. Ark. Broad. Co., 170 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. E.D.Ark. 1994).
127 In re Draughon Training Inst., Inc., 119 B.R. 921, 926 (Bankr. W.D.La. 1990).
128 Id. at 59.
129 276 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2002).
130 Id. at 928.
131 Id.
132 See United States v. Cleveland, 951 F.Supp. 1249, 1263 (D.LA. 1997); see also In re
Barnes, 276 F.3d at 928.
133 See Elsinore Shore Assoc. (In re Elsinore Shore Assoc.), 66 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1986); Vill. of Rosemont v. Jaffe, 482 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007); In re NVR, L.P., 189 F.3d
442 (4th Cir. 1999).
134 Czarnetzky, supra note 115, at 462-67; Stocker, supra note 7, at 375.
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the motives behind the revocation of the license.135 The state does not enjoy a
blanket protection by claiming coverage under the police and regulatory powers
exemption, but must demonstrate that there is some threat to the safety and
general welfare of public interest at hand.136
In re Elsinore Shore Associates137 stressed the difference between a state
acting out of purely pecuniary interests and a state seeking to ensure the safety
of its citizens.138 The Elsinore court held a state statute that conditioned
renewal of a gaming license on the payment of prepetition fees “stands as a
clear obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress as contained in the
Bankruptcy Code[.]”139 The court came to this conclusion by examining a
lengthy string of cases regarding the use of police and regulatory powers and
the pivotal differences between nonmonetary and monetary motivation.140 The
Elsinore court observed that, in some instances, even when valid public safety
policies protect state pecuniary interests only indirectly, the state’s use of police
power could nonetheless be in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code.141 Con-
versely, the Elsinore court examined a case where leeway was given to the
state’s use of police power in environmental regulations even though the use of
the debtor’s assets to rectify the violations would substantially deplete the
debtor’s assets.142 In that case, the court chose to allow the exemption over the
protestations of the debtor.143
Elsinore and the following commentary by various scholars surmise that
the bankruptcy court has to examine the validity of the state regulatory
agency’s purpose and evaluate the level of pecuniary interest.144 Finally, the
court must decide on a case-by-case basis whether the agency is authorizing a
valid exercise of police power or disguising their motivation to obtain superpri-
ority within the rank and file of creditors.
Village of Rosemont v. Jaffe,145 a case decided twenty-one years later by
the Seventh Circuit, is the latest case on point with license revocation in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Two scholars, Robert Stocker and Peter Kulick, consider
Rosemont to possibly enlarge the scope of § 362(b)(4) and the regulatory
body’s power to conduct license revocation hearings against a casino debtor.146
In Rosemont, the debtor was engaged in an on-again, off-again disciplinary
hearing.147 Ultimately, the Illinois Gaming Board (“IGB”) issued an order
revoking the gaming license based on the ineligibility of its associates, the
incompleteness of the application process, and the debtor’s dishonest behav-
135 See In re Elsinore Assoc., 66 B.R. at 723.
136 Czarnetzky, supra note 115, at 466-67.
137 66 B.R. 723.
138 Id. at 723.
139 Id. at 743.
140 See id. at 734-743.
141 Id. at 734 (citing In re Jacobsmeyer, 13 B.R. 298 (Bankr. W.D.Mo. 1981)).
142 Id. at 735.
143 Id.
144 Czarnetzky, supra note 115, at 466-67.
145 482 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007).
146 Stocker, supra note 7, at 375.
147 Jaffe, 482 F.3d at 930-32.
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ior.148 Stocker and Kulick point to an enigmatic statement149 in Rosemont,
which proclaims:
Nor do we accept the argument that we should treat Emerald’s license as a res with
respect to which the bankruptcy court had the authority to displace the state’s police
power. If the question were merely who was entitled to a license that was not subject
to revocation, we would have a different case. But whatever property right the license
conferred has always been subject to, or conditioned on, the regulatory powers of the
state. Nothing in the bankruptcy laws permits the court to enjoin the Board, a state
regulatory agency, from exercising the police powers of the state to regulate the gam-
bling industry.150
While the strong language of the opinion may lead a reader to believe the
court was enlarging the scope of the police power exemption, the court did not
accord § 362(b)(4) more power than is traditionally given. Instead, the analysis
mirrored Elsinore’s examination of the underlying motive behind the license
revocation. The paramount question remained whether the state had monetary
interests at stake or whether the state was acting in furtherance of public safety.
Ultimately, the court analogized IGB’s actions to that of a criminal proceeding
rather than an act of a creditor seeking compensation. Therefore, taken as a
whole, Rosemont likely stands in support of the same precedent that has existed
since Elsinore.
On its face, this statement could also stand for the view that the gaming
license is not property of the estate, and the bankruptcy court lacks the power to
enjoin the IGB from conducting any regulatory hearings.151 However, the court
specifically states, “that even though Emerald’s license is for some purposes
‘property of the estate,’ . . . the Code forbids the bankruptcy court from inter-
fering with the government’s police and regulatory powers.”152 Additionally,
the court later points to § 362(b)(4) as the basis supporting the bankruptcy
court’s lack of power to enjoin IGB.153 The court would not have needed to
reach § 362(b)(4) if it disqualified the license from being property of the estate.
C. Can a State Use the Seminole/Hood/Katz Line of Cases to Claim
Sovereign Immunity?
The beauty of the Katz decision is that it struck a fine balance between the
valid use of state police power and the impermissibility of a state’s desire to
obtain a superpriority status by requiring fees and taxes to be paid in order to
renew a gaming license. Initially, under § 106(a), the bankruptcy court could
abrogate state sovereign immunity by merely stating that a state policy or an
action frustrated the Bankruptcy Code. This heavy-handed preemption is pre-
cisely the type of policy that Seminole wanted to avoid. However, Seminole’s
overreaching led to absurd results inconsistent with the core policies of the
Bankruptcy Code. As criticism and confusion mounted, Katz was decided and
148 Id. at 932.
149 Stocker, supra note 7, at 375.
150 Jaffe, 482 F.3d at 936-37.
151 Id. at 938.
152 Id. (citation omitted).
153 Id.
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subsequently restored order to the analysis of police power with regard to
license revocation during the period of the automatic stay.
Legislative history concerning the automatic stay states:
[W]here a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory
laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceed-
ing is not stayed under the automatic stay.154
However, as illustrated by In re Elsinore’s lengthy analysis, if a state’s
motivation is pecuniary, then the use of police power in the form of license
revocation is in violation of the stay. After Seminole was decided, states no
longer needed to fear this analysis.
Although not a case concerning a license revocation, In re Fernandez155
dealt with the obvious pecuniary interest of whether the debtor or the state held
valid title to two parcels of land.156 The bankruptcy court initially used
§ 106(a) to abrogate state sovereign immunity and allowed an adversary pro-
ceeding to be brought against the state to resolve the conflict of ownership.157
However, the federal district court reversed the bankruptcy court.158 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that due to the
recent Seminole opinion, § 106(a) was unconstitutional, and the bankruptcy
court could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to an Article I
power and, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the state.159
If Fernandez was heard after Katz was decided, the court would have
most likely come to a different outcome. Katz dealt with avoidance of preferen-
tial transfers, which directly affect the property and value of the estate. In the
same vein, resolution of title disputes over assets included in the estate has the
same effect. If the state is allowed to claim sovereign immunity, the value of
the estate lowers, while the state escapes the liability of the bankruptcy code. In
a post Katz era, sovereign immunity would likely have been abrogated.
Even more on point with Katz is In re Creative Goldsmiths.160 Goldsmiths
is another example of the inequity resulting from a state acquiring superpriority
status. The Fourth Circuit held that an avoidance of preferential transfer against
a tax collection agency was not permitted under the Seminole doctrine.161
Goldsmiths is the stark opposite of the decision in Katz and demonstrated the
inherent danger to the purpose of bankruptcy. Although the original bankruptcy
court’s ruling was conducted in the “ordinary course of business” and, there-
fore, exempt from avoidance,162 the state raised the Eleventh Amendment argu-
ment of state sovereignty on appeal,163 and the Fourth Circuit set a dangerous
154 Midlantic Nat.’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 504 (1986) (citing
H.R.REP. NO. 95-595; S.Rep. No. 95-989, at 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5838, 6299; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 52 (1978)) (emphasis omitted).
155 In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1997).
156 Id. at 243.
157 Id. at 242.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 246.
160 In re Creative Goldsmiths of D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
161 See id. at 1143-47.
162 Id. at 1143.
163 Id.
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precedent. By allowing the state to succeed on its immunity argument, the court
enabled the state to become an all-powerful creditor in future bankruptcy litiga-
tion. No more would the state have to submit to the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court. The state could easily sit on the sidelines and use enforcement
measures, such as license revocation, to collect their debt and leave the debtor
impotent without the fundamental protections provided by the bankruptcy code.
Goldsmiths would have likely taken a different turn in a post-Katz era.
Katz deemed preferential transfers “ancillary to and in the furtherance of the
court’s in rem jurisdiction.”164 Therefore, while the Court ordered turnover of
property involves in personam jurisdiction, the states have given a limited
waiver to sovereign immunity for precisely these types of situations.165
Turning to the process of license revocation, Katz has brought the entire
analysis full circle. Before the Seminole holding, Elsinore and other similar
cases studied the state’s motive for license revocation. The focus was central-
ized on whether the state was revoking the license based on pecuniary interests
or societal benefit. After Seminole, the ability to conduct this inquiry was sti-
fled by the state’s ability to claim sovereign immunity. As demonstrated in
Fernandez and Goldsmiths, motive was irrelevant, and the state could assume
the most beneficial stance possible when dealing with the bankruptcy court.
After Katz, the focus is once again back on the status of the state as a
monetary player in the proceeding. While the case history for license revoca-
tion in a post-Katz era is small, Village of Rosemont v. Jaffe166 addressed the
implication of Katz on the license revocation and sovereign immunity issues.
The Rosemont court specifically examined whether the license revocation was
an act of a creditor or an act of the state exercising its police and regulatory
powers.167 The court distinguished Katz from the facts in Rosemont by point-
ing to the state’s lack of monetary benefit from revoking the gaming license.168
“[In Katz] the question was simple: who gets the money, the bankruptcy estate
or the state agency? The Board here had no claim against [the casino]; it was
not [the casino’s] creditor.”169
The Rosemont court held that the license revocation was permissible dur-
ing a bankruptcy proceeding under § 362(b)(4)’s police and regulatory powers
exemption to the automatic stay.170 However, the analysis used was much dif-
ferent from that of In re National Cattle Congress,171 a pre-Katz/post-Seminole
era case. The Cattle Congress court failed to conduct much of an analysis
whatsoever because Seminole did not give much room for latitude concerning
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under an Article I power. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals merely stated “[t]here is much to indicate that [the
Eleventh Amendment argument] may be a complex and serious issue,” and
164 Cent. Va. Comty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 372 (2006).
165 Id. at 377-78.
166 482 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007).
167 Id. at 936.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 937.
171 Nat’l Cattle Cong., Inc. v. Iowa Racing & Gaming Comm’n (In re Nat’l Cattle Cong.,
Inc.), 91 F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 1996).
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remanded it back to the district court for further proceedings in light of the
Seminole holding.172 The case was never brought in front of a court again.
However, given the trends of that era, the court would have likely upheld the
state sovereign immunity like many other courts presented with similar
arguments.
At the end of this long and circuitous road, the bankruptcy court is approx-
imately at the same place it started. States may still claim sovereign immunity
and utilize the police and regulatory exemption of the automatic stay if the
motive is appropriate. Enforcement of the automatic stay is ancillary to bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and Katz has returned the power to the court to retrieve
property of the estate due to an inherent limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, the question of § 106’s constitutionality has yet to
be answered. However, the Supreme Court has provided some clarity for the
bankruptcy courts. Katz struck a fine balance by allowing the gaming regula-
tors to conduct their investigations and hearings under state authorized power
while prohibiting the regulatory board from obtaining superpriority status
amongst creditors.
While hindsight is always an accurate lens to analyze situations through,
the Supreme Court decided Katz at the most opportune time. If the Supreme
Court had waited another five years to tackle—or at least attempt to tackle the
constitutionality of § 106—the country would have weathered the Great Reces-
sion in a Seminole era. Casino bankruptcies are on the rise and more are
expected. Gaming regulatory bodies would have enjoyed carte blanche power
with the trump card of sovereign immunity. According to Bankruptcy Court
Judge Gregg Zive, this would create an “untenable” situation.173 States are feel-
ing the economic crunch as much as any private organization, and would have
understandably done what was within their legal rights in order to recover
funds from casino debtors.
The bankruptcy court is back where it started. The Elsinore analysis con-
tinues to be the hallmark of litigating sovereign immunity issues with respect to
gaming license revocation in a bankruptcy setting. The doctrine is sound, fair,
and affords both the casino debtor and state governmental unit their inherent
rights under the Bankruptcy Code.
172 Id. at 1114.
173 Zive, supra note 14, at 292.
